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41 CRYPTO TOPICS AND APPLICATIONS IIJennifer Seberry, Chris Charnes, Josef Pieprzyk, and Rei Safavi-NainiCenter for Computer Security Research, University of Wollongong0.42 INTRODUCTIONIn this chapter we continue our exposition of the crypto topics which was begun in the previouschapter. This chapter covers: Secret Sharing, Threshold Cryptography, Signature Schemes, andnally Quantum Key Distribution and Quantum Cryptography. As in the previous chapter,we have focussed only on the essentials of each topic. We have included in the bibliographysucient items which can be consulted for further details.First we give a synopsis of the topics which are discussed in this chapter.Secret sharing is concerned with the problem of how to distribute a secret among a group ofparticipating individuals, or entities, so that only pre-designated collections of individuals areable to recreate the secret by collectively combining the parts of the secret which were allocatedto them. There are numerous applications of secret sharing schemes in practice. One exampleof secret sharing occurs in banking. For instance, the combination to a vault may be distributedin such a way that only specied collections of employees can open the vault by pooling theirportions of the combination. In this way the authority to initiate an action, e.g., the opening ofa bank vault, is divided for the purposes of providing security and for added functionality suchas auditing if required.Threshold cryptography is a relatively recently studied area of cryptography. It deals with situa-tions where the authority to initiate or perform cryptographic operations is distributed amongsta group of individuals. Many of the standard operations of single-user cryptography have coun-terparts in threshold cryptography.Signature schemes deal with the problem of generating and verifying (electronic) signatures fordocuments. A sub-class of signature schemes is concerned with the shared-generation and shared-1
verication of signatures, where a collaborating group of individuals is required to perform theseactions.A new paradigm of security has recently been introduced into cryptography with the emergenceof the ideas of Quantum Key Distribution and Quantum Cryptography. While classical cryp-tography employs various mathematical techniques to restrict eavesdroppers from learning thecontents of encrypted messages, in quantum mechanics the information is protected by the lawsof physics.0.43 Secret Sharing0.43.1 IntroductionSecret sharing is concerned with the problem of distributing a secret among a group of partici-pating individuals, or entities, so that only pre-designated collections of individuals are able torecreate the secret by collectively combining their shares of the secret.The earliest and the most widely studied type of secret sharing schemes are called (t; n)-thresholdschemes. In these schemes the access structure { a specication of the participants which areauthorized to recreate the secret { comprises all the possible t-element subsets selected from an-element set.The problem of realizing, i.e., implementing secret sharing schemes for threshold structures wassolved independently by Blakley [12] and Shamir [75] in 1979. Shamir's solution is based on theproperty of polynomial interpolation in nite elds; Blakley formulated and solved the problemin terms of nite geometries.In a (t; n)-threshold scheme, each of the n participants holds some shares (also called, shadows)of the secret. The parameter t  n is called the threshold value. A fundamental property of a(t; n)-threshold scheme is that the secret can only be recreated if at least t shareholders combinetheir shares, but less than t shareholders cannot recreate the secret. The fact that the key canbe recovered from the combined shares of any t-sized subset is a property which makes thresholdschemes very useful in key management. Threshold schemes tolerate the invalidation of up ton  t shares { the secret can still be recreated from the remaining intact shares.2
Secret sharing schemes are also used to control the authority to perform critical actions. Forexample, a bank vault can be opened only if say, any two out of three trusted employees of thebank agree to do so by combining their partial knowledge of the vault combination. In this case,even if any one of the three employees is not present at any given time the vault can still beopened, and no single employee has sucient information about the combination to open thevault.Secret sharing schemes which do not reveal any information about the shared secret to unau-thorized individuals are called perfect. This notion will be formally dened in Section 0.43.2. Inthis survey we discuss both perfect and non-perfect schemes, as the latter schemes are provingto be useful in various secret sharing applications.Besides the (t; n)-threshold structures, more general access structures are encountered in thetheory of secret sharing. These will be considered in Section 0.43.13. General access structuresapply to situations where the trust-status of the the participants is not uniform. For example,in the bank scenario described earlier, it might be considered more secure to authorize eitherthe bank manager, or any two out of three senior employees to open the vault.Since Blakley's and Shamir's papers have appeared, the study of secret sharing has developedinto an active area of research in cryptography. The fundamental problem of the theory andpractice of secret sharing deals with the issue of how to implement secret sharing schemes forarbitrary access structures. We shall describe later some of the solutions to this problem. Sim-mons [79] gives numerous examples of practical situations which require secret sharing schemes.He also gives a detailed account of the geometric approach to secret sharing. Stinson's [84]survey is broader and more condensed.Simmons [78] discusses secret sharing schemes with extended capabilities. He argues that thereare realistic applications in which schemes with extended capabilities are required. We assumethere exists a key distribution center (KDC) which is trusted unconditionally.0.43.2 Models of secret sharingA common model of secret sharing has two phases. In the initialization phase, a trusted entity{ the dealer, distributes shares of a secret to the participants via secure means. In the recon-3
struction phase the authorized participants submit their shares to a combiner, who reconstructsthe secret on their behalf. It is assumed that the combiner is an algorithm which only performsthe task of reconstructing the secret. We denote the sets of all possible secrets and shares by Kand S respectively; the set of participants in a scheme is denoted by P . Secret sharing schemescan be modeled using the information theory concept of entropy (cf. [45]). This approach wasinitiated by Karnin, Greene and Hellman [54] and developed further by Capocelli, De Santis,Gargano and Vaccaro [23].Denition 1 A secret sharing scheme is a collection of two algorithms. The rst (the dealer)is a probabilistic mapping D : K ! S1  S2  : : : Snwhere Si  S (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n) and Si is a subset of shares which is used to generate a share forthe participant Pi 2 P. The second (the combiner) is a functionC : Si1  Si2  : : : Sit ! Ksuch that if the corresponding subset of participants fPi1 ; Pi2 ; : : : ; Pitg belongs to the access struc-ture  , it produces the secret K 2 K, i.e.H(K j Pi1 ; Pi2 ; : : : ; Pit) = 0: (1)The combiner fails to recompute the secret if the subset of participants does not belong to theaccess structure  , i.e. H(K j Sl)  0 (2)for Sl = fsi1 ; si2 ; : : : ; silg and Sl =2  .In equation (1), H(K j Pi1 ; Pi2 ; : : : ; Pit) is calculated with respect to the shares of the partic-ipants. A secret sharing scheme is called perfect if H(K j Sl) = H(K) for any unauthorizedsubset of participants, i.e., not belonging to an access structure   (cf. Section 0.43.13).The following result is proved by Karnin et al [54].Theorem 1 A necessary condition for a perfect threshold scheme is that for each share si, theinequality H(si)  H(K) holds. 4
Most of the secret sharing schemes which we discuss satisfy this inequality, but we will also con-sider in Section 0.43.17 schemes, which do not satisfy this inequality; these are called nonperfectschemes.The matrix modelA matrix representation of perfect secret sharing schemes was introduced by Brickell and Stinson[21]. The matrix model is often used in theoretical investigations of secret sharing. In thismodel a perfect secret sharing scheme is formulated as a matrix M which is known by all theparticipants P in the scheme. The jPj+1 columns ofM are indexed as follows. The rst columncorresponds to the dealer D, the remaining columns are indexed by the remaining participantsin P . Each row of M contains one of the possible keys K which is to be shared in column D,and the shares of K are located in the remaining columns. When the dealer wants share K, arow r which has K in the D-column is chosen uniformly and randomly. The dealer distributesthe shares of K to each participant using the matrix M , i.e. participant Pj receives the entryMr;j as his share.The general requirements of a perfect secret scheme translate into the following combinatorialconditions in the matrix model, cf. Stinson [84], and Blundo, De Santis, Stinson and Vaccaro[15]. Suppose that   is an access structure.1. If B 2   and M(r; P ) =M(r0; P ) for all P 2 B, then M(r;D) =M(r0;D).2. If B 62  , then for every possible assignment f of shares to the participants in B, sayf = (fP : P 2 B), a nonnegative integer (f;B) exists such thatjfr :M(r; P ) = fP 8P 2 B; M(r;D) = Kgj = (f;B)is independent of the value of K.0.43.3 a Information rateThe information rate of secret sharing schemes was studied by Brickell and Stinson [21]. It isa measure of the amount of information that the participants need to keep secret in a secretsharing scheme. The information rate of a participant Pi in a secret sharing scheme with jSij5
shares is: i = log2jKjlog2jSij :The information rate of the scheme, denoted , is dened to be the minimum of the i.A proof of the fact that   1 is given by Stinson [84]. This result motivates the denition ofideal secret sharing schemes.Denition 2 A perfect secret sharing scheme is called ideal if  = 1; that is, if the size of eachparticipants share, measured in the number of bits, equals the size of the secret.We now dene another measure used to quantify the comparison between secret sharing schemes(cf. Section 0.43.13).Denition 3 ( ) is the maximum value of  for any perfect secret sharing scheme realizingthe access structure  .For any access structure it is desirable to implement a secret sharing scheme with informationrate close to 1. This minimizes the amount of information that needs to be kept secret by theparticipants, which means that there is a greater chance of the scheme remaining secure. Forexample, a (t; n)-threshold scheme implemented as in Shamir's method is ideal, but when thescheme is modied to prevent cheating as proposed by Tompa and Woll [87], it is no longer ideal.(Cf. Section 0.43.12.)0.43.4 Some known schemesWe now describe several well known threshold secret sharing schemes.0.43.5 b Blakley's schemeBlakley [12] implements threshold schemes using projective spaces over nite elds GF (q). Aprojective space PG(t; q) is dened from the corresponding t+1-dimensional vector space V (t+1; q) by omitting the zero vector of V (t+1; q) and identifying two vectors v and v0 satisfying therelation v = v0, where  is a non-zero element of GF (q). This denes an equivalence relation6
on V (t + 1; q). The set of equivalence classes, i.e, the lines through the origin of V (t + 1; q),are the points of PG(t; q); there are (qt   1)=(q   1) such points. Similarly, each k-dimensionalsubspace of V (t+ 1; q) corresponds to a (k   1)-dimensional subspace of PG(t; q). Every pointof PG(t; q) lies on (qt 1)=(q 1) (t 1)-dimensional subspaces which are called the hyperplanesof PG(t; q).To realize a (t; n)-threshold scheme, the secret is represented by a point p chosen randomly fromPG(t; q); each point p belongs to (qt 1)=(q 1) hyperplanes. The shares of the secret are the nhyperplanes, which are randomly selected and distributed to the participants. If q is sucientlylarge and n is not too large, then the probability that any t of the hyperplanes intersect in somepoint other than p, is close to zero, cf. Blakley [12]. Thus generally the secret can be recoveredfrom any t of the n shares. The secret cannot be recovered from the knowledge of less thant hyperplanes, as these will intersect only in some sub-space containing p. This scheme is notperfect, since a coalition of unauthorized insider participants has a greater chance of guessingthe secret than an unauthorized group of outsider participants.Blakley's geometric solution to the secret sharing problem has grown into an active area ofresearch. We will cover some of these developments in this survey.0.43.6 c Simmons' schemeSimmons formulates secret sharing schemes in terms of ane spaces instead of projective spaces.The reasons for using ane spaces instead of projective spaces are explained by Simmons [79].(There is a correspondence between projective spaces and ane spaces, cf. Beth, Jungnickeland Lenz [9].) Briey, an ane space AG(n; q) consist of points { the vectors of V (n; q), anda hierarchy of l-dimensional subspaces for l  n and their cosets. These correspond to theequivalence classes in projective geometry mentioned above, and are called the ats of AG(n; q).The equivalence classes of lines, planes, etc. of AG(t; q) are: the 1-dimensional, 2-dimensionaletc. ats. A hyperplane is a at of co-dimension one. To realize a (t; n)-threshold scheme inAG(t; q), the secret is represented by a point p chosen randomly from AG(t; q), which lies on apublicly known line Vd, (lines have q points). A hyperplane Vi of the indicator variety is selectedso that Vi intersects Vd in a single point p. The shares of the secret are the subsets of points of7
Vi. An authorized subset of participants, which spans Vi, enables reconstruction of the secret.If an unauthorized subset of participants attempts to reconstruct the secret, their shares willonly span a at which intersects Vd in the empty set. Thus they gain no information aboutthe secret. The precise amount of information gained by the unauthorized participants aboutthe secret can be expressed in terms of the dening parameters of AG(n; q). These schemesare perfect. Simmons [79] gives a detailed explanation of the implementation of secret sharingschemes using projective and ane spaces.0.43.7 d Shamir's schemeShamir's [75] scheme realizes (t; n)-access structures based on polynomial interpolation overnite elds. In his scheme the secrets S belong to a prime power nite eld GF (q), whichsatises q  n+ 1: In the initialization phase, the dealer D chooses n distinct nonzero elementsfx1; : : : ; xng from GF (q) and allocates these to participants fP1; : : : ; Png. This correspondenceis publicly known, and creates undesirable side eects if any of the participants are dishonest;see Section 0.43.12. However for now, we will assume that all the participants obey faithfullythe protocol for reconstructing the secret.Fix a random element of GF (q) as the secret K. The shares of K are created using the followingprotocol.(a) D chooses a1; a2; : : : ; at 1 from GF (q) randomly, uniformly and independently.(b) Let a(x) be a polynomial of degree at most t  1, dened as a(x) = K + a1x+ a2x2 +   +ak 1xk 1.(c) The shares of the secret key are: yi = a(xi), for 1  i  n.With the above data, if any t out of the n participants fxi1 ; : : : ; xitg, combine their sharesfyi1 ; : : : ; yitg, then using Lagrangian interpolation, there is a unique polynomial of degree atmost t   1 passing through the points: f(xi1 ; yi1); : : : ; (xit; yit)g. So the combined shares ofthe t participants can be used to recreate the polynomial a(x), and hence the secret, which isK = a(0). 8
The relation between the secret and the shares is obtained from Lagrange's interpolation formulaas: K = tXj=1 yijbj; (3)where the bj are dened as bj = Y1  k  t;k 6= j xikxik   xij :Shamir's scheme is computationally ecient in terms of the computational eort required tocreate the shares and to recover the secret. Also the share size is optimal in an informationtheoretic sense, cf. Section 2.The reconstruction phase in Shamir's scheme can also be considered as a system of linear equa-tions, which are dened by the shares Ki. If t shares are submitted to the combiner, the systemof linear equations: yij = K + a1xij + a2x2ij +   ak 1xk 1ij ; j = 1; : : : tcan be solved for the unknowns K; a1; a2; : : : ; at 1 because the determinant of this system ofequations is a nonsingular Vandermonde determinant. (The fx1; : : : ; xng are pair-wise distinct.)However, if t   1 participants try to reconstruct the secret, they face the problem of solvingt   1 linear equations in t unknowns. This system of equations has one degree of freedom.Consequently, t   1 participants do not obtain any information about the secret, as K wasselected uniformly and randomly from GF (q). Shamir's system is perfect.0.43.8 e A (t; t) threshold schemeKarnin et al [54] describe a secret sharing scheme which realizes (t; t)-access structures. Theinterest in such schemes is that they can be used as the basis for other cryptographic construc-tions. 9
In their scheme, the set of secrets S is the the ring of residue classes Zm, where m is any integer.(In applications m is large.) The secret K is shared using the following algorithm.(a) D secretly chooses randomly, uniformly and independently t   1 elements y1; y2; : : : ; yt 1from Zm; yt is dened as yt = K   t 1Xi=1 yi mod m:(b) Participant Pi for 1  i  t, receives the share yi from D.The above system is perfect, as the following argument shows. The set of shares of l < t partici-pants attempting to reconstruct the secret either contains the share yt = K Pt 1i=1 yi mod m, ornot. In both cases the (unauthorized) participants lack the necessary information to determineK. Shamir's scheme with t = n provides an alternative construction of (t; t)-threshold schemes,using the elds GF (q) instead of Zm.0.43.9 Threshold schemes and discrete logarithmsThe discrete logarithm has been widely employed in the literature to transform threshold schemesinto conditionally secure schemes with extra properties. This idea is exploited in the papers by:Benaloh [1], Beth [10], Charnes, Pieprzyk and Safavi-Naini [27], Charnes and Pieprzyk [28], Linand Harn [58], Langford [56], and Hwang and Chang [50].It is a consequence of the linearity of equation (3) that Shamir's scheme can be modied to obtainschemes having enhanced properties such as disenrollment capability, in which shares from oneor more participants can be made incapable of forming an updated secret. (The formal analysisof schemes with this property was given by Blakley, Blakley, Chan and Massey [13].) Let a(x)be a polynomial and let a(i) be the shares as in Shamir's scheme. In the modied thresholdscheme proposed by Charnes, Pieprzyk and Safavi-Naini [27], ga(0) is the secret and the sharesare si = gci , ci = a(i). A generator g of the cyclic group of the eld GF (2n) is chosen so that2n   1 is a Mersenne prime.The modied (t; n)-threshold schemes are capable of disenrolling participants whose shares havebeen compromised either through loss or theft, and still maintain the original threshold level. Inthe event that some of the original shares are compromised, the KDC can issue using a public10
authenticated channel a new generator g0 of the cyclic group of GF (2n). The shareholders cancalculate their new shares si0 from the initial secret data according tosi0 = g0ci :Hwang and Chang [50] used a similar setting to obtain dynamic threshold schemes.Threshold schemes with disenrollment capability, without the assumption of the intractability ofthe discrete logarithm problem, can be based on families of threshold schemes. The propertiesof these schemes are studied in a paper by Charnes, Pieprzyk and Safavi-Naini [26]; here weprovide the basic denition.Denition 4 A threshold scheme family (TSF) is dened by an (m n) matrix of shares [si;j ]such that:1. Any row (si;1; si;2; : : : ; si;n) represents an instance of TSri(ti; n) where i = 1; : : : ; m.2. Any column (s1;j ; s2;j; : : : ; sm;j) represents an instance of TScj (tj ; m) where j = 1; : : : ; n.A family of threshold schemes in which all rows and all columns are ideal schemes is called anideal threshold scheme family, or ITS family for short. In these schemes it is possible to alterdynamically the threshold values by moving from one level of the matrix to another.Lin and Harn [58] and Langford [56] use the discrete logarithm to transform Shamir's schemeinto a conditionally secure scheme which does not require a trusted KDC. A similar approach isused by Langford [56] to obtain a threshold signature scheme. Beth [10] describes a protocol forveriable secret sharing for general access structures based on geometric schemes. The discretelogarithm problem is used to encode the secret and the shares so that they can be publiclyannounced for verication purposes.It should be noted that the denition of disenrollment given by Charnes et al [27] is not the sameas that of Blakley et al [13]. Blakley et al establish a lower bound on the number of bits requiredto encode the shares in schemes with disenrollment. Their bound shows that this number growslinearly with the number of disenrollments. They also present two geometric (t; n)-thresholdschemes which meet this bound. 11
It is interesting to note that Benaloh [1] uses the discrete logarithm to transform Shamir'sscheme, to meet a very dierent purpose. One of the properties of the discrete logarithmis that the sum of the discrete logarithms of the shares of a secret is equal to the discretelogarithm of the product of the shares of the secret. This property has an application in secret-ballot elections (cf. Benaloh [1]) where, in contrast with schemes mentioned above, the discretelogarithm problem is required to be tractable.The homomorphic property introduced by Benaloh [1] has prompted the question whether similarschemes can be set up in non-commutative groups { other than the additive and multiplicativegroups of nite elds. Frankel and Desmedt [44] prove that perfect homomorphic thresholdschemes cannot be set up in non-commutative groups. It is an open problem to nd usefulapplications of homomorphic schemes in abelian groups.0.43.10 Error Correcting Codes and Secret SharingMcEliece and Sarwate [61] observe that Shamir's scheme is closely related to Reed-Solomoncodes [62]. The advantage of this formulation is that the error correcting capabilities of theReed-Solomon codes can be translated into desirable secret sharing properties.Let (0; 1; : : : ; q 1) be a xed list of the nonzero elements of a nite eld GF (q) containing qelements. In a Reed-Solomon code, an information word a = (a0; a1; : : : ; ak 1), ai 2 GF (q), isencoded into the codewordD = (D1; D2; : : : ; Dr 1), whereDi =Pk 1j=0 ajij . In this formulationthe secret is a0 =  Pr 1i=1 Di and the shares distributed to the participants are the Di.In the above formulation of threshold schemes, algorithms such as the errors-and-erasures de-coding algorithm can be used to correct t out of s shares where s  2t  k in a (k; n)-thresholdscheme, if for some reason these shares were corrupted. The algorithm will also locate whichinvalid shares Di were submitted, either as a result of deliberate tampering or as a result ofstorage degradation.Karnin et al [54] realize threshold schemes using linear codes. Massey [59] introduced the conceptof minimal codewords, and proved that the access structure of a secret sharing scheme based ona [n; k] linear code is determined by the minimal codewords of the dual code. To realize a (t; n)-threshold scheme, a linear [n+1; t; q] code C over GF (q) is selected. If G is the generator matrix12
of C and s 2 GF (q) is the secret, then the information vector s = (s0; s1; : : : ; st 1) is any vectorsatisfying s = s  gT , where gT is the rst column vector of G. The codeword correspondingto s is sG = (t0; t1; : : : ; tn). Each participant in the scheme receives ti as its share and t0 isthe secret. To recover the secret, rst the linear dependency between g and the other columnvectors in the (public) generator matrix G is determined. If g = Pxjgj is the linear relation,the secret is given by Pxjtij , where fti1 ; ti2 ; : : : ; titg is a set of t shares.Renvall and Ding [69] consider the access structures of secret sharing schemes based on linearcodes as used by McEliece and Sarwate and Karnin et al. They determine the access structuresthat arise from [n + 1; k; n   k + 2] MDS codes { codes which achieve the singleton bound[62]. Bertilsson and Ingemarsson [8] use linear block codes to realize secret sharing schemesfor general access structures. Their algorithm takes a description of an access structure by amonotone Boolean formula  , and outputs the generator matrix of a linear code which realises .0.43.11 Combinatorial structures and secret sharingThere are various connections between combinatorial structures and secret sharing, cf. [9]. Stin-son and Vanstone [85], and Schellenberg and Stinson [72] study threshold schemes based oncombinatorial designs. Stinson [84] uses balanced incomplete blocks designs to obtain generalbounds on the information rate  of schemes with access structure based on graphs (cf. 0.43.15).Street [83] surveys dening sets for t-designs and critical sets for Latin squares, with the view ofapplying these concepts to multilevel secret sharing schemes, in which a hierarchical structurecan be imposed on the shares. To illustrate these methods, we give an example of a (2; 3)-threshold scheme based on a small Latin square, cf. Chaudhry and Seberry [31]. For an exampleof a scheme with a hierarchical share structure, cf. Street [83].Let (i; j; k) denote that the value k is in position (i; j) of the Latin squareL = 0BBB@ 1 2 32 3 13 1 21CCCA :The shares of the secret, which is L, are: S = f(2; 1; 1); (3; 2; 1); (1; 3; 3)g.13
More recently, critical sets in Room squares have been used to realize multilevel secret sharingschemes, cf. Chaudhry and Seberry [31]. Some other approaches to multilevel schemes areconsidered in the papers by: Beutelspacher [11] and Cooper et al [33]. The schemes based onLatin and Room squares are examples of nonperfect schemes which will be discussed in Section0.43.17.0.43.12 The Problem of cheatersSo far we have assumed that the participants in a secret sharing scheme are honest and obeythe reconstruction protocol. However, there are conceivable situations where a dishonest cliqueof participants (assuming an honest KDC) may attempt to defraud the honest participants byaltering the shares they were issued.In the McEliece and Sarwate formulation of Shamir's scheme, invalid shares can be identied.Schemes with this capability are said to have the cheater identication property. A weakercapability ascertains that invalid shares were submitted in the reconstruction phase withoutnecessarily locating the source of these shares; this is called cheater detection.Tompa and Woll [87] show that public knowledge of the ordinates in Shamir's scheme allowsa clique of dishonest participants to modify their shares resulting in an invalid secret K0 beingrecreated. Suppose that participants i1; i2; : : : ; it agree to pool their shares in order to recreatethe secret. A dishonest participant, say i1, can determine a polynomial (x) of degree at mostt   1 from: (0) =  1 and (i2) = (i3) =    = (it) = 0 using Lagrangian interpolation.Instead of the share originally issued by the dealer, the cheater submits the modied sharea(i1) + (i1). Lagrangian interpolation of points using the modied share will result in thepolynomial a(x) + (x) being recreated, instead of the intended polynomial a(x). Now theconstant term is a(0)+(0) = K 1, a legal but incorrect secret. The honest participants believethat the secret is K 1, but the cheater privately recovers the correct secret as K = (K 1)+1.To prevent this type of cheating, Tompa and Woll dene the shares in their scheme as:(x1; d1); (x2; d2); : : :(xn; dn). The dealer chooses randomly and uniformly a permutation(x1; x2; : : : ; xn) of n distinct elements from f1; 2; : : : ; q   1g, and di = a(xi). The modiedscheme resists the above attack for up to t   1 cheaters. The expected running time of the14
scheme is polynomial in k; n; logs and log(1=), where  is a designated security parameter ofthe scheme and the secret k is chosen from f0; 1; : : : ; s  1g. But the participants need to keepsecure two shares instead of the usual single share.Brickell and Stinson [20] modied Blakley's geometric (t; n)-scheme and obtainied a schemein which cheaters can be detected and identied. Blakley et al [13] proved that this scheme iscapable of disenrolling participants; cf. Section 0.43.9. To set up the scheme, the dealer performscertain computations such as checking that the shadows are in general position. It is an openproblem whether these computations can be done eciently as the numbers of participantsincrease.The problem of secret sharing without the usual assumptions about the honesty of the partici-pants, or even the KDC has been considered in the literature. For example, in veriable secretsharing it is not assumed that the dealer is honest. This problem is studied by Chor, Goldwasser,Micali and Awerbuch [32]. The problem is how to convince the participants in a (t; n)-thresholdscheme, that every subset of t shares of a share set fs1; s2; : : : ; sng denes the same secret. Thisis called t-consistency. In Shamir's scheme, t-consistency is equivalent to the condition thatinterpolation on the points (1; s1); (2; s2); : : : ; (n; sn) yields a polynomial of degree at most t 1.As application of homomorphic schemes, Benaloh [1] gives an interactive proof that Shamir'sscheme is t-consistent.0.43.13 General access structuresA complete discussion of secret sharing requires the notion of a general access structure.Ito, Saito and Nishizeki [52] describe a method to realize secret sharing schemes for generalaccess structures. They observe that for most applications of secret sharing it suces to considermonotone access structures (MAS), dened as follows.Denition 5 Given a set P of n participants (jPj= n), a monotone access structure on P is afamily of subsets A  2P such that A  A0  P ) A0 2 A (4)15
The intersubsection A1 \ A2, and the union A1 [ A2 of two monotone access structures is amonotone access structure. If A is a monotone access structure, then 2P n A = A is not aMAS. Any MAS can be expressed equivalently by a monotone Boolean function. Conversely,any Boolean expression without negations represents a MAS.In view of the above observations, we consider the minimal authorized subsets of an accessstructure A on P . A set B 2 A is minimal authorized, if for each proper subset A of B, it isthe case that A 62 A. The set of minimal authorized subsets of A is called the basis. An accessstructure A is the unique closure of the basis, i.e. all subsets of P which are supersets of thebasis elements.Some examples of inequivalent access structures on four participants are given by the followingmonotone formulae:  1 = P1P2P3 + P1P2P4 + P1P3P4 + P2P3P4 { a (3; 4)-threshold scheme; 2 = P1P2+P3P4;  4 = P1P2+P2P3+P3P4. In these formulae, the Pi's represent the participantsin the scheme (sometimes the literals A;B etc. are used). The authorized subsets in the accessstructure are specied precisely by these formulae. For example,  2 stipulates that either P1AND P2 OR P3 AND P4 are the authorized subsets. (It is known that no threshold scheme canrealize the access structure dened by  2. For a proof, cf. Benaloh and Leichter [2].)The inequivalent access structures on three and four participants, and the information rates ofsecret sharing schemes realizing these structures are given by Simmons, Jackson and Martin[80] and by Stinson [84]. The information rates of all inequivalent access structures on veparticipants are discussed by Martin and Jackson [60]. It should be remarked that an exhaustiveexamination of access structures is probably limited to ve participants. For more than veparticipants, the number of equivalence classes of monotone Boolean formulae becomes toogreat to consider. However, Martin and Jackson [60] provide inductive methods using which theinformation rates of an access structure   is related to the information rates of smaller accessstructures which are `embedded' in  .Secret sharing schemes for non-monotone access structures have also been investigated, cf. Sim-mons [79]. 16
0.43.14 Realising general access structuresIto et al [52] were the rst to show how to realize secret sharing schemes for general accessstructures. Benaloh and Leichter [2] simplied the method of Ito et al.They show that any monotone access structure can be recognized by amonotone boolean circuit.In a monotone circuit, each variable corresponds to an element of P . The circuit outputs a truevalue only when the set of variables which take a true value corresponds to an authorized subsetof P , i.e. belongs to the access structure. Monotone circuits are described by Boolean formulaewhich involve only AND and OR operators. Using Benaloh and Leichter's method, one canrealise any access structure as a composite of sub-secrets. The sub-secrets are shared acrossAND gates by (t; t)-threshold schemes for appropriate t, and all the inputs to the OR gates havethe same value.Simmons, Jackson and Martin [80] show how cumulative arrays, rst studied by Ito et al [52],can be used to realize geometric secret sharing schemes for general access structures.Denition 6 A cumulative array CA = (S; f)A for the access structure A is a pair comprisingof the share set S = fs1; s2; : : :g, and the dealer function f : P ! 2S which assigns subset ofshares to each participant.As an example, consider the following access structure:A = closureffP1; P2g; fP2; P3g; fP3; P4g; fP1; P4gg;where P = fP1; P2; P3; P4g. Let S = fs1; s2g. A cumulative array for this access structure is:f(P1) = s1, f(P2) = s2, f(P3) = s1, and f(P4) = s2.Perfect geometric secret sharing schemes are obtained from cumulative arrays as follows. Choosea projective space Vi = PG(m 1; q), where m is the number of columns in the cumulative array.In Vi, let fsi; : : : ; sm; Kg be m+ 1 points such that no m points lie on a hyperplane of Vi { thepoints are in general position. A domain variety Vd is chosen so that ViTVd = fKg. The set ofshares in the geometric scheme is fsi; : : : ; smg and K is the secret. The shares are distributedusing the cumulative array: participant Pi receives share sj if and only if the (i; j) entry of thearray is one. Note that, it could be dicult to verify the general position hypothesis for large m,17
cf. Brickell and Stinson [20]. Jackson and Martin [53] show that any geometric secret sharingscheme realising an access structure is `contained' in the cumulative array which realises theaccess structure.For any access structure A on the set P , there is a unique minimal cumulative array. Thus toimplement geometric secret sharing schemes with the minimal number of shares, we need onlyconsider minimal cumulative arrays. It remains only to have a means by which the minimalcumulative array can be calculated given an arbitrary monotone boolean function  . Such amethod was rst given by Simmons, Jackson and Martin [80]. It relies on minimizing the booleanexpression which results when the AND and OR operators in   are exchanged.An alternative method for calculating minimal cumulative arrays is described by Charnes andPieprzyk [29]. Their method has the advantage that the complete truth table of   is not requiredfor some  , thereby avoiding an exponential time computation. For general Boolean expressions,as the number of variables increases the time complexity of the above method and the methodgiven by [80] is the same.To describe the method of Charnes and Pieprzyk [29], we require the following.Denition 7 ([29]) The representative matrix M  of a monotone Boolean function (P1; P2; : : : ; Pn), expressed as a disjunctive sum of r products of n variables, is an n r matrixwith rows indexed by the Pi and columns by the product terms of the Pi. The (i; j)-entry is oneif Pi occurs in the j-th product, and is zero otherwise.For example, if   = P1P2 + P2P3 + P3P4, then M  is the following matrix:P1P2 P2P3 P3P4P1 1 0 0P2 1 1 0P3 0 1 1P4 0 0 1Suppose that  (P1; P2; : : : ; Pn) is a monotone formula expressed in minimal disjunctive form,i.e. a disjunctive sum of products of the Pi and no product term is contained in any other. LetM  be its representative matrix. 18
Denition 8 ([29]) A subset fPl; Pm; : : :g of the variables of  (P1; P2; : : : ; Pn) is a relation setif PlPm    is represented in M  by the all ones vector.In the representative matrix above, fP1; P3g, fP2; P3g, and fP2; P4g are the minimal representa-tive sets, i.e., not contained in any other representative set. The Boolean formula derived fromthese sets is P1P3 + P2P3 + P2P4.Theorem 2 ([29]) Let  (P1; P2; : : : ; Pn) be a monotone formula and M  its representative ma-trix. Let R be the collection of minimal relation sets of M . Then the representative matrixwhose rows are indexed by the variables Pi and columns by product terms derived from R is theminimal cumulative array for A.Thus, using the above theorem the matrixP1P3 P2P3 P2P4P1 1 0 0P2 0 1 1P3 1 1 0P4 0 0 1is the minimal cumulative array for   = P1P2+P2P3+P3P4. To realize   as a geometric scheme,we require a projective space Vi = PG(2; q). The secret K 2 Vd, and the shares fs1; s2; s3g arepoints chosen in general position in Vi. The cumulative array species the distribution of theshares: P1 receives share fs1g; P2 receives shares fs2; s3g; P3 receives shares fs1; s2g; P4 receivesshare fs3g. It can be easily veried that only the authorized subsets of participants can recreatethe secret, e.g. the combined shares of P1 and P2 span Vi, hence these participants can recoverthe secret as Vi \ Vd = fKg. But unauthorized participants, e.g. P1 and P3, cannot recover thesecret.An algorithm for calculating cumulative arrays, based on Theorem 2, is described by Charnesand Pieprzyk [29]. This algorithm is ecient for those   which have columns containing manyzeros in M . Thus in the previous example, the combinations: fP1; P2g, fP1; P4g and fP3; P4gcannot produce relation sets and can be ignored. Further computational economy is obtained ifthe boolean formula has a large degree of symmetry.19
0.43.15 Ideal and other schemesBrickell [18] gives a vector space construction for realizing ideal secret sharing schemes for certaintypes of access structures,  . Let  be a function : P [ fDg ! GF (q)dwith the property that (D) can be expressed as a linear combination of the vectors in< (Pi) : Pi 2 B > if and only if B is an authorized subset, i.e. B 2  . Then, for anysuch , the distribution rules (cf. Section 0.43.2) are: for any vector a = (a1; : : : ; sd) in GF (q)d,a distribution rule is given by the inner product of a and (x) for every x 2 P [ fDg. Underthe above conditions, the collection of distribution rules is an ideal secret sharing scheme for  .A proof of this result can be found in a paper by Stinson [84].Shamir's (t; n)-threshold scheme is an instance of the vector space construction. Access struc-tures  (G), whose basis is the edge set of certain undirected graphs, can also be realized as idealschemes by this construction. In particular the access structure  (G), where G = (V;E) is acomplete multigraph can be realized as an ideal scheme. A proof of this is given by Stinson [84].A relation between ideal secret sharing schemes and matroids was established by Brickell andDavenport [19]. The matroid theory counterpart of a minimal linearly dependent set of vectorsin a vector space is called a circuit. A coordinatizable matroid is one which can be mapped intoa vector space over a eld in a way that preserves linear independence. Brickell and Davenport[19] prove the following theorem about coordinatizable matroids.Theorem 3 ([19]) Suppose the connected matroid M = (X; I) is coordinatizable over a niteeld. Let x 2 X and let P = X nfxg. Then there exists an ideal scheme for the connected accessstructure having basis  0 = fC n fxg : x 2 C 2 Cg, where C denotes the set of circuits of M.There are limits to the access structures that can be realized as ideal secret sharing schemes.This was rst established by Benaloh and Leichter [2]. They proved that the access structureon four participants specied by the monotone formula   = P1P2 + P2P3 + P3P4, cannot berealised by an ideal scheme. The relation between the size of the shares and the key for   wasmade precise by Capocelli et al [23]. They prove the following information theoretic bound.20
Theorem 4 For the access structure   = closureffP1; P2g; fP2; P3g; fP3; P4gg on four partic-ipants fP1; P2; P3; P4g, the inequality H(P2) + H(P3)  3H(K) holds for any secret sharingscheme realizing  .From this theorem it follows that the information rate  of any secret sharing scheme realizing  satises the bound   23 . Bounds are also derived by Capocelli et al [23] for the maximuminformation rate  of access structures  (G), where the graph G is: a path Pn (n  3); a cycleCn, n  6, for n even and n  5, for n odd; or any tree Tn.0.43.16 Realising schemes ecientlyIn view of bounds on the information rates of secret sharing schemes, it is natural to askwhether there exist schemes whose information rates equal the known bounds. For example, for  = P1P2 + P2P3 + P3P4 one is interested in realizations of   with  = 23 .Stinson [84] used a general method, called decomposition construction, to build larger schemesstarting from smaller ideal schemes. In this method, the basis  0 of an access structure isdecomposed into smaller access structures, as:  0 = [ k , where the  k are the basis of theconstituent access structures which can be realized as ideal schemes. From such decompositionsof access structures, Stinson [84] derives a lower bound: ( )  `=R, where ` and R are twoquantities dened in terms of the ideal decomposition of  0. The decomposition construction andits precursor, the graph decomposition construction (cf. Blundo et al. [15]), can be formulatedas linear programming problems in order to derive the best possible information rates that areobtainable using these constructions.Other ways of realizing schemes with optimal or close to optimal information rates are consideredby Charnes and Pieprzyk [30]. Their method combines multiple copies of cumulative arrays usingthe notion of composite shares { combinations of the ordinary shares in cumulative arrays. Thisprocedure is stated as an algorithm which outputs a cumulative array with the best informationrate. It is not clear how ecient this algorithm is as the numbers of participants increases.However, the optimal information rates for access structures on four participants given by Stinson[84] can be attained by combining cumulative arrays.21
0.43.17 Nonperfect schemesIt is known that in nonperfect schemes the size of the shares is less that the size of the secret,i.e. H(si) < H(K). Because of this inequality, a nonperfect scheme can be used to disperse acomputer le to n sites, in such a way that the le can be recovered from its images which areheld at any t of the sites (t  n). Moreover, this can be done so that the size of the imagesis less than the size of the original le, resulting in an obvious saving of disk space. Makingbackups of computer les using this method provides insurance against the loss or destructionof valuable data. For details, cf. Karnin et al [54].A formal analysis of nonperfect secret sharing schemes is given by Ogata, Kurosawa and Tsujii[66]. Their analysis characterizes, using information theory, secret sharing schemes in which theparticipants not belonging to an access structure do gain some information about the secret.This condition is precluded in perfect secret sharing schemes.Ogata et al [66] dene a nonperfect scheme in terms of a triple of access sets ( 1; 2; 3), whichpartition the set of all subsets of the participants P .  1 is the family of access subsets,  2 isthe family of semi-access subsets and  3 is the family of non-access subsets. The participantsbelonging to the semi-access subsets are able to obtain some, but not complete informationabout the secret. The participants which belong to the non-access subsets gain no informationabout the secret.The ramp schemes of Blakley and Meadows [14] are examples of nonperfect schemes wherethe access structure consists of semi-access subsets. Another way of viewing ramp schemes isthat the collective uncertainty about a secret gradually decreases as more participants join thecollective.Ogata et al [66] prove a lower bound on the size of the shares in nonperfect schemes. They alsocharacterize nonperfect schemes for which the size of the shares is jKj=2.Ogata and Kurosawa [65] establish a general lower bound for the sizes of shares in nonperfectschemes. They show that there is an access hierarchy for which the size of the shares is strictlylarger than this bound. It is in general a dicult problem to realize nonperfect secret sharingschemes with the optimum share size, as in the case of perfect schemes.22
0.44 THRESHOLD CRYPTOGRAPHYThere are circumstances where an action requires to be executed by a group of people. Forexample, to transfer money from a bank a manager and clerk need to concur. A bank vaultcan be opened only if three high ranking bank employees co-operate. A ballistic missile can belaunched if two ocers authorize the action.Democratic groups usually exhibit a at relational structure where every member has equalrights. On the other hand, in hierarchical groups, the privileges of group members depend ontheir position in the hierarchy. A member on the level i  1 inherits all the privileges from thelevel i, as well as additional privileges specic to its position.Unlike single user cryptography, threshold or society-oriented cryptography allows groups toperform cryptographic operations such as encryption, decryption, signature, etc. A trivial im-plementation of group-oriented cryptography can be achieved by concatenating secret sharingschemes and a single user cryptosystem. This arrangement is usually unacceptable as the co-operating subgroup must rst recover the cryptographic key. Having access to the key cancompromise the system, as its use is not conned to the requested operation. Ideally, the coop-erating participants should perform their private computations in one go. Their partial resultsare then sent to a so-called combiner who calculates the nal result. Note that at no point isthe secret key exposed.A group-oriented cryptosystem is usually set up by a dealer who is a trusted authority. Thedealer generates all the parameters, distributes elements via secure channels if the elementsare secret or broadcasts the parameters if they need not be protected. After setting up agroup cryptosystem, the dealer is no longer required, as all the necessary information has beendeposited with the participants of the group cryptosystem.If some participants want to cooperate to perform a cryptographic operation, they use a combinerto perform the nal computations on behalf of the group. The nal result is always correct if theparticipants belong to the access structure and follow the steps of the algorithm. The combinerfails if the participants do not belong to the access structure, or if the participants do not followthe algorithm (that is, they cheat). The combiner need not be trusted; it suces to assume that23
it will perform some computations reliably but not necessarily all.The access structure is the collection of all subsets of participants authorized to perform anaction. An example is a (t; n)-threshold scheme, where any t out of n participants are authorizedsubsets (t  n).Threshold cryptography provides tools for groups to perform: threshold encryption { a group generates a valid cryptogram which can later be decryptedby a single receiver; threshold decryption { a single sender generates a valid cryptogram which can be decryptedby a group; threshold authentication { a group of senders agrees to co-authenticate the message so thereceiver can decide whether the message is authentic or not; threshold signature (multisignature) { a group signs a message which is later validated bya single verier; threshold pseudorandom generation.0.44.1 Threshold encryptionPublic-key cryptography can be used as a basis for simple group encryption. Assume that areceiver wants to have a communication channel from a group of n participants P = fP1; : : : ; Png.Further suppose that the receiver can decrypt a cryptogram only if all participants co-operate{ i.e. a (n; n)-threshold encryption system. Group encryption works as follows.Assume that the group and the receiver agree to use the RSA cryptosystem with the modulusN = pq. The receiver rst computes a pair of keys: one for encryption e and the other fordecryption d, where e  d  1 mod (p   1)(q   1). Both keys are secret. The factors p and qare known by the receiver only. The encryption key is communicated to the dealer (via a securechannel). The dealer selects n   1 shares ei of the encryption key at random from the interval[0; e=n]. The last share is en = e  n 1Xi=1 ei:24
Each share ei is communicated to participant Pi via a secure channel (i = 1; : : : ; n).Now if the group wants to send a message m to the receiver, each participant Pi prepares itspartial cryptogram ci  mei mod N (i = 1; : : : ; n). After collecting n partial cryptograms, thereceiver can recover the message m  (Qni=1 ci)d mod N . Note that the receiver also plays therole of a combiner. Moreover, the participants need not reconstruct the secret encryption key eand at no stage of decryption is the encryption key revealed { this is a characteristic feature ofthreshold cryptography.Many existing secret-key algorithms such as: the DES [64], LOKI [22], FEAL [76], or the RussianGOST [82], are not homomorphic. These algorithms cannot be used for threshold encryption.The homomorphic property is necessary in order to generate shares of the key so that partialcryptograms can be combined into a cryptogram for the correct message, cf. [1].Threshold encryption has not received a great deal of attention, perhaps because of its limitedpractical signicance.0.44.2 Threshold decryptionHwang [49] proposes a cryptosystem for group decryption based on the discrete logarithm prob-lem. In his system it is assumed that the sender knows the participants of the group. The senderencrypts the message using a predetermined (either private or public key) cryptosystem with asecret key known to the sender only. The sender then distributes the secret key among the groupof intended receivers using Shamir's (t; n)-threshold scheme. Any t co-operating participants canrecover the decryption key and decrypt the cryptogram. In Hwang's scheme, key distribution isbased on the Die-Hellman [39] protocol. Thus the security of his scheme is equivalent to thesecurity of the discrete logarithm problem. However, the main problem with the above solutionis that the key can be recovered by a straightforward application of secret sharing. This violatesthe fundamental requirement that the decryption key must never be revealed to the group (orcombiner).We consider now an implementation of a scheme for (t; n)-threshold decryption. The groupdecryption used here is based on the ElGamal public-key cryptosystem [41] and is described byDesmedt and Frankel [35]. 25
The system is set up by the dealer D who rst chooses a Galois eld GF (q) such that q   1 isa Mersenne prime and q = 2`. Further D selects a primitive element g 2 GF (q) and a nonzerorandom integer s 2 GF (q). The dealer computes y = gs mod q and publishes the triple (g, q, y)as the public parameters of the system. The dealer then uses Shamir's (t; n)-threshold schemeto distribute the secret s among the n shareholders in such a way that for any subset B of tparticipants, the secret s =PPi2B si mod (q   1) (all calculations are performed in GF (q)).Suppose that user A wants to send a message m 2 GF (q) to the group. A rst chooses atrandom an integer k 2 GF (q) and computes the cryptogram c = (gk; myk) for the message m.Assume that B is an authorized subset, so it contains at least t participants. The rst stageof decryption is executed separately by each participant Pi 2 B. Pi takes the rst part ofthe cryptogram and computes (gk)si mod q. The result is sent to the combiner, who computesyk = gks = Qi2B gksi , and decrypts (using the multiplicative inverse y k) the cryptogramm  myk  y k mod p:Group decryption can also be based on a combination of the RSA cryptosystem [70] and Shamir'sthreshold scheme. The scheme described by Desmedt and Frankel [36] works as follows. Thedealer D computes the modulus N = pq, where p, q are strong primes, that is, p = 2p0 + 1 andq = 2q0 + 1 (where p0 and q0 are large and distinct primes). The dealer selects at random aninteger e such that e and (N) are coprime ((N) is the least common multiple of two integersp   1 and q   1, so (N) = 2p0q0). Next D publishes e and N as the public parameters of thesystem, but keeps p, q, and d secret (d satises the congruence ed = 1 mod (N)). It is clearthat computing d is easy for the dealer who knows (N), but is dicult { equivalent to thefactoring of N { to someone who does not know (N). The dealer then uses Shamir's schemeto distribute the secret s = d  1 amongst n participants. The shares are denoted si and any tco-operating participants (the set B) can retrieve the secret. We have,s =Xi2B si mod (N):Group decryption of the cryptogram c  me mod N starts from individual computations. EachPi 2 B calculates its partial cryptogram csi mod N . All the partial cryptograms are sent to the26
combiner who recovers the messagem = Yi2B csi  c  c(Pi2B si+1)  cd  (me)d mod N:Again the secret s = d  1 is never exposed during the decryption.Ghodosi, Pieprzyk and Safavi-Naini [46] given a solution to the problem of group decryptionwhich does not require a dealer. It uses the RSA cryptosystem and Shamir's threshold scheme.The system works under the assumption that all participants from P = fP1; : : : ; Png have theirentries in a public registry (white pages). The registry provides the public parameters of a givenparticipant. A participant Pi has as its RSA entry Ni; ei in the registry, and this entry cannotbe modied by an unauthorized person.The sender rst selects the group P = fP1; : : : ; Png. For the message m (0 < m < Qni=1Ni),the sender computes mi  m mod Nifor i = 1; : : : ; n. Next the sender selects at random a polynomial f(x) of degree at most t overGF (p), where p < miniNi. Letf(x) = a0 + a1x+ : : :+ at 1xt 1The sender computes ci = f(xi) for public xi, k = f(0), ceii mod Ni, and mki mod Ni (i =1; : : : ; n). Finally, the sender merges ceii mod Ni into C1 and mki mod Ni into C2 using the Chi-nese Remainder Theorem. The sender broadcasts the tuple (N; p; t; C1; C2) as the cryptogram.The participants check whether they are the intended recipients, by nding the gcd (Ni; N)for instance. Note that the sender can give the list of all participants instead of the modulusN . A participant Pi rst recovers the pair (ceii mod Ni) and (mki mod Ni) from C1 and C2,respectively. Using its secret key di, the participant retrieves ci. The ci are now broadcast sothat each participant can reconstruct f(x) and nd k = f(0). Note that none of the participantscan cheat, as it can be readily veried whether c0i satises the congruencec0eii  C1 mod Ni:Knowing k, each participant nds the message mi  Ck 12 mod Ni. Although k is public, onlyparticipant Pi can nd k 1  k mod (pi   1)(qi   1) from his knowledge of the factorization of27
Ni = piqi. Lastly, all the partial messages are communicated to the combiner who recovers themessage m by the Chinese Remainder Theorem.0.45 SIGNATURE SCHEMESA signature scheme consists of two algorithms: signature generation and signature verication.Each of these algorithms can be collaboratively performed. A shared-generation scheme allowsa group of signers to collaboratively sign a document. In a signature scheme with sharedverication, the signature verication requires collaboration of a group. We examine the twotypes of systems and note that the two can be combined if necessary.0.45.1 Shared generation schemesIn these schemes a signer group P of n participants has a public/private key pair. The privatepart is shared among members of the group such that each member has part of the private keywhich is not known to anyone else. The signature scheme is usually based on one of the wellknown signature schemes such as ElGamal, Schnorr, RSA and Fiat-Shamir.The group is created with an access structure that determines the authorized groups of signers.A special case of shared-generation schemes are multisignature schemes, in which collaborationof all members in P is necessary. Most systems proposed for shared generation are of the mul-tisignature type, or its generalization, (t; n)-threshold signature. In the latter type of signatureeach subgroup p, p  P of size t, can generate the signature.A shared-generation scheme can be sequential or simultaneous. In a sequential scheme eachmember of the group signs the message and forwards it to the next group member. In someschemes, after the rst signer the message is not readable and all subsequent signers must blindlysign the message. In a simultaneous scheme, each group member forms a partial signature whichis sent to a combiner who forms the nal signature.There are a number of issues that dierentiate shared-generation systems.1. Mutually trusted party: a system may need a mutually trusted party who is usually activeduring the key generation phase; it chooses the group secret key and generates secrets for28
all group members. In systems without a trusted party, each signer produces his secretkey and participates in a protocol with other signers to generate the group public key.2. The security of most signatures schemes is based on the intractability of one of the followingproblems: discrete logarithm or integer factorization. Shared-generation schemes based onElGamal and Schnorr signature schemes use the former, while those based on RSA andFiat-Shamir use the later.3. Using many/few interactions for producing signature. The amount of interaction betweenthe signers and the trusted third party varies in dierent schemes.There are properties { some essential and some desirable { that a shared-generation schememust satisfy. The essential properties are:A1 Signature generation must require collaboration of all members of the authorized groupand no signer in the group should be able to deny his signature. Verication must bepossible by any outsider.A2 An unauthorized group should not be able to forge the signature of an authorized group.It should not also be possible for an authorized group to forge the signature of anotherauthorized group.A3 No secret information should be derivable from the released group and partial signatures.The desirable properties are:1. Each signer must have the same power and be able to see the message that he is signing.2. The order of signing in a sequential scheme should not be xed.3. The size of the multisignature should be comparable, preferably the same, as the size ofthe individual signature.For a (t; n) threshold signature scheme (A1) and (A2) reduce to:B1 From any t partial signature the group signature should be easily derivable.29
B2 Knowledge of t  1 or fewer partial signatures should not reduce the chance of forgery ofan unauthorized group.0.45.2 ConstructionsThe earliest proposals for shared-generation schemes are by Itakura [51] and by Boyd [16].Boyd's scheme is a (n; n)-threshold group signature based on RSA, in which if n > 2, mostparticipants must blindly sign the message.0.45.3 f Threshold RSA signatureDesmedt and Frankel [36] construct a simultaneous threshold (t; n) RSA signature which requiresa trusted third party to generate and distribute the group public key and the secret keys of thesigners.Their scheme works as follows. In the initialization stage, a trusted KDC (dealer) selects atrandom a polynomial of degree t  1: f(x) = a0+a1x+a2x2+   +at 1xt 1. The group secretkey k is xed as a0 = f(0). The dealer gives yi = f(xi) to participant Pi, for each i, via a securechannel. The computations are performed in Z(N), where  = 2p0q0 and p = 2p0+1; q = 2q0+1.To sign a message m (0  m < N) each participant Pi 2 B, calculates its partial signaturesi = mki mod N and transmits the result to the combiner. The combiner computes the signatureS of the message m according to the following:S = m YPi2B si = m tYPi2Bi=1 mki = mmd 1 = md mod NThe signature verication is similar to the conventional RSA signature scheme.0.45.4 g Threshold signature based on discrete logarithmOhta and Okamoto [67] propose a sequential multisignature scheme based on the Fiat-Shamirsignature scheme. In their scheme, the order of signing is not restricted but the scheme requiresa trusted center for key generation. 30
A variation of group signature is undeniable group signature, in which verication requires col-laboration of signers. The signature scheme has a `commitment phase' during which t groupmembers work together to sign a message. And a `verication phase' during which all signerswork together to prove validity of the signature to an outsider. Harn and Yang [48] propose two(t; n)-threshold schemes, with t = 1 and t = n. Their schemes do not require a trusted thirdparty and the algorithm is based on the discrete logarithm problem.Harn [47] proposes three simultaneous multisignature schemes, based on the diculty of discretelogarithm. Two of these schemes do not require a trusted third party. We briey review one ofthe schemes. of these schemes. We use the notation of Harn [47].Let KDC denote the Key Distribution Center. The KDC selects:1. p, a large prime, in the range 2511  p  25122. q, a prime divisor of p  13. fai; i = 0; : : : ; t  1g, and f(x) = a0 + a1x+   + at 1xt 1 (mod q) where 0 < ai < q4. , where  = h(p 1)=q (mod p) > 1.  is a generator with order q in GF(p). p, q and are made public.The KDC computes the group public key y = f(0) mod p, where f(0) is the group secret key.The KDC also computes public keys for all group members as:yi = f(xi) (mod p); for i = 1; 2; : : : ; nwhere f(xi) mod q is the share of participant i from the group secret key. (Note that, since  isa generator with order q in GF (p), r mod p = r mod q, for any nonnegative integer r.)In order to generate the group signature on a messagem, each participant of a group B (jBj  t)randomly selects an integer, ki 2 [1; q   1], and computes a public value, ri = ki mod p andbroadcasts ri to all members in B. Knowing all the ri (i 2 B), each member of the group Bcomputes, r = Yi2B ri (mod p)31
Participant i computes his partial signature assi = m0  f(xi) 0BB@Yi;j2Bi6=j xj(xi   xj)1CCA   ki  r (mod p)where H(m) = m0 (H is a one-way and collision free hash function) and transmits (ri; si) to adesignated combiner.Once the combiner receives the partial signature (ri; si), it is veried usingy(m0)(Qi;j2Bi6=j xj(xi xj ) )i = sirri (mod p)If all the partial signatures are veried, then the combiner calculates the group signature (r; s)on message m, where s =Pi2B si (mod q).An outsider who receives the signature (r; s) on the message m can verify the validity of thesignature using the check ym0 = srr (mod p). This check works becausef(0) =Xi2B f(xi) Yi;j2Bi6=j xj(xi   xj) (mod q)and thus,ym0 = (f(0))m0 = ((Pi2B f(xi)Qi;j2Bi6=j xj(xi xj ) )m0 = Yi2B y(m0)(Qi;j2Bi6=j xj(xi xj ) )i = Yi2B(rriasi ) = rrsAn interesting security problem in these schemes, as discussed by Desmedt and Frankel [36] andby Harn [47], is that if more than t signers collaborate they can nd the secrets of the systemwith a high probability, and thus identify the rest of the shareholders. Possible solutions to thisproblem in the case of discrete logarithm based schemes can be found in a paper by Li, Hwangand Lee [57].A concept related to threshold signature is t-resilient digital signatures. In these schemes, nmembers of a group can collaboratively sign a message even if there are t dishonest members.Moreover no subset of t dishonest members can forge a signature.Desmedt [34] shows that a t-resilient signature scheme with no trusted center can be constructedfor any signature scheme using a general multiparty protocol. Cerecedo, Matsumoto and Imai32
[24] present ecient protocols for the shared generation of signatures based on the discretelogarithm problem, Schnorr's scheme and variants of the ElGamal scheme. Their protocols arebased on an ecient multiparty protocol for shared computation of products and they do notneed a trusted party. Park and Kurosawa [68] discuss a (t; n)-threshold scheme based on thediscrete logarithm, more precisely a version of Digital Signature Standard (DSS), which doesnot require multiplication and only uses linear combination for combination of shares.Chang and Liou [25], and Langford [56] propose other signature schemes based on the discretelogarithm problem.0.45.5 Shared verication of signaturesSignature schemes with shared verication are not commonly found in in literature.Soete, Quisquater and Vedder [81] propose a system for shared verication of signatures. Buttheir system is not really a signature scheme in the sense that it does not produce a signature forevery message. Each user has a secret that enables him to verify himself to others. It requiresat least two veriers for the secret to be veried.Laih and Yen [55] argue that in some cases it might be necessary to sign a message such thatonly specied groups of participants can verify the signed message. The main requirements ofsuch schemes are:1. A can sign any message M for any specied group B.2. Only the specied group can validate the signature of A. No other group, except B, canvalidate the signature of A on M .3. B should not be able to forge A's signature on M for another user C even if B and Cconspire.4. No one should be able to forge A's signature on another message M 0.5. If A disavows his signature, it must be possible for a third party to resolve the disputebetween A and B. 33
The scheme proposed by Laih and Yen [55] is based on Harn's scheme, which is an ecientElGamal type shared-generation scheme. In the proposed scheme a group of signers can createa digital shared-generation scheme for a specied group, who can collectively check the validityof the signature. The secret key of the users is chosen by the users themselves and each grouphas a public key for signature generation or verication. Since the private key of the veriersis not known, dispute settlement by a third party requires an extra protocol between the thirdparty and the veriers.0.46 QUANTUMKEYDISTRIBUTION - QUANTUMCRYPTOGRAPHYWhile classical cryptography employs various mathematical techniques to restrict eavesdroppersfrom learning the contents of encrypted messages, in quantum mechanics the information isprotected by the laws of physics. In classical cryptography absolute security of informationcannot be guaranteed. However on the quantum level there is a law called the Heisenberguncertainty principle. This states that even the most rened measurement on a quantum objectcannot reveal everything about the object before the measurement was made. This is becausethe object may be altered by simply taking the measurement. The Heisenberg uncertaintyprinciple and quantum entanglement can be exploited in a system of secure communication,often referred to as `quantum cryptography' [6]. Quantum cryptography provides means fortwo parties to exchange a enciphering key over a private channel with complete security ofcommunication.There are at least three main types of quantum cryptosystems for the key distribution, theseare: BB protocol: Cryptosystems with encoding based on two non-commuting observables pro-posed by Wiesner (1970), and by Bennett and Brassard (1984) [89]. EPR-type: Cryptosystems with encoding built upon quantum entanglement and the BellTheorem proposed by Ekert (1990) [42]. B-type: Cryptosystems with encoding based on two non-orthogonal state vectors proposedby Bennett (1992) [3]. 34
A BB quantum cryptosystem can be explained using the following simple example. The systemincludes a transmitter, Alice, and a receiver, Bob. Alice may use the transmitter to send photonsin one of four polarisations: 0, 45, 90, or 135 degrees. Bob at the other end uses the receiverto measure the polarisation. According to the laws of quantum mechanics, Bob's receiver candistinguish between rectilinear polarisations (0 and 90), or it can quickly be recongured todiscriminate between diagonal polarisations (45 and 135); it can never, however, distinguishboth types. The key distribution requires several steps. Alice sends photons with one of thefour polarisations which are chosen at random. For each incoming photon, Bob chooses atrandom the type of measurement: either the rectilinear type or the diagonal type. Bob recordsthe results of the measurements but keeps them secret. Subsequently Bob publicly announces thetype of measurement (but not the results) and Alice tells the receiver which measurements wereof the correct type. Alice and Bob (the sender and the receiver) keep all cases in which Bob'smeasurements were of the correct type. These cases are then translated into bits (1's and 0's)and thereby become the key. An eavesdropper is bound to introduce errors to this transmissionbecause he/she does not know in advance the type of polarisation of each photon and quantummechanics does not allow him/her to acquire sharp values of two non-commuting observables(here rectilinear and diagonal polarisations). The two legitimate users of the quantum channel,Alice and Bob, test for eavesdropping by revealing a random subset of the key bits and checking(in public) the error rate. Although they cannot prevent eavesdropping, they will never be fooledby an eavesdropper because any, however subtle and sophisticated, eort to tap the channel willbe detected. Whenever they are not happy with the security of the channel they can try to setup the key distribution again. The mechanism of privacy amplication is used to nally distill asecret key between Alice and Bob from these interactions, cf. Bennett, Brassard and Robert [7].The basic idea of cryptosystems of EPR-type is as follows. A sequence of correlated particlepairs is generated, with one member of each pair being detected by Alice and the other byBob (for example, a pair of so-called Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen photons, whose polarisations aremeasured by Alice and Bob). An eavesdropper on this communication would have to detect aparticle to read the signal, and retransmit it in order for his/her presence to remain unknown.However, the act of detection of one particle of a pair destroys its quantum correlation with theother. Thus Alice and Bob can easily verify whether this has been done, without revealing the35
results of their own measurements, by communication over an open channel.In our example we will consider two types of measurement: we consider n and = to be one type(diagonal) and j and   to be the other (rectilinear).1. Alice's polarisation j n   j =         n /2. Bits Alice sent 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 13. Bob's polarisation j n j n j j / j   n  4. Bits Bob registered 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 15. Alice states publiclywhether Bob's Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Nopolarisation wascorrect or not6. Alice's remaining bits 0 0 1 x x 1 x 1 0 1 x7. Bob's remaining bits 0 0 1 x x 1 x 1 0 1 xx means discard8. Alice and Bob 0 0 1 x x 1 x 1 0 1 xcompare bits 0 0 1 x x 1 x 1 0 1 xchosen at random OK OK OK9. Alice's remaining bits x 0 1 x x 1 x x 0 x x10. Bob's remaining bits x 0 1 x x 1 x x 0 x x11. The key 0 1 1 00.46.1 Shor's quantum factoring algorithmMathematicians have tried hard to solve the key distribution problem and in the 1970s a clevermathematical discovery called `public key' systems gave an elegant solution. Public-key cryp-tosystems avoid the key distribution problem but unfortunately their security depends on un-proven mathematical assumptions, such as the diculty of factoring large integers (RSA - themost popular public key cryptosystem gets its security from the diculty of factoring large num-36
bers). An enemy who knows your public key can in principle calculate your private key becausethe two keys are mathematically related; however, the diculty of computing the private keyfrom the respective public key is exactly that of factoring big integers.Diculty of factoring grows rapidly with the size, i.e. number of digits, of the number we wantto factor. To see this, take a number N with ` decimal digits (N  10` ) and try to factor itby dividing it by 2; 3;    ;pN and checking the remainder. In the worst case approximatelypN  10`=2 divisions may be needed to solve the problem - an exponential increase as a functionof `. Now imagine a computer capable of performing 1010 divisions per second. The computercan then factor any number N , using the trial division method, in about pN=1010 seconds.Take a 100-digit number N , so that N  10100. The computer will factor this number in about1040 seconds, much longer than 1017 seconds - the estimated age of the universe!It seems that factoring big numbers will remain beyond the capabilities of any realistic computingdevices and unless mathematicians or computer scientists come up with an ecient factoringalgorithm public-key cryptosystems will remain secure. Or will they? As it turns out weknow that this is not the case; the classical, purely mathematical, theory of computation is notcomplete simply because it does not describe all physically possible computations. In particularit does not describe computations which can be performed by quantum devices. Indeed, recentwork in quantum computation shows that a quantum computer can factor much faster than anyclassical computer.Quantum computers can compute faster because they can accept as input not just one number,but a coherent superposition of many dierent numbers, and subsequently perform a compu-tation (a sequence of unitary operations) on all of these numbers simultaneously. This can beviewed as a massive parallel computation, but instead of having many processors working inparallel we have only one quantum processor performing a computation that aects all compo-nents of the state vector. To see how it works let us describe Shor's factoring using a quantumcomputer composed of two quantum registers.37
FACTORINGQuantum factoring of an integer N is based on calculating the period of thefunction FN (x) = ax (mod N). We form the increasing powers of a until theystart to repeat with a period we denote r. Once r is known the factors of N canbe found using the Euclidean algorithm to nd the greatest common divisor ofar=2  1 and N .Suppose we want to factor 91. Let us take a number at random, say 28, and raiseit to the powers 2; 3;   . After 12 iterations we nd we have the number 28repeated and so we use r = 12. Hence we want to nd gcd(91; 286  1), whichwe nd to be 1 and 13 respectively. From here we can factorize 91. Classically,calculating r is as dicult as trying to factor N and the execution time is ex-ponential in the number of digits in N . Quantum computers can nd r in timewhich grows only as a quadratic function of the number of digits of N .Consider two quantum registers, each register being composed of a certain number of two-statequantum systems which we call `qubits' (quantum bits). We take the rst register and place itin a quantum superposition of all the possible integer numbers it can contain. This can be doneby starting with all qubits in the 0 states and applying a simple unitary transformation to eachqubit which creates a superposition of 0 and 1 states:j0i  ! 1p2(j0i+ j1i) (5)Imagine a two-qubit register, for example. After this procedure the register will be in a super-position of all four numbers it can contain,1p2(j0i+ j1i) 1p2(j0i+ j1i) = 12(j00i+ j01i+ j10i+ j11i) (6)where 00 is binary for 0, 01 binary for 1, 10 binary for 2 and nally 11 which is binary for 3.Then we perform an arithmetical operation that takes advantage of quantum parallelism bycomputing the function FN (x) for each number x in the superposition. The values of FN (x) are38
placed in the second register so that after the computation the two registers become entangled:Xx jxijFN(x)i (7)(we have ignored the normalization constant). Now we perform a measurement on the secondregister. The measurement yields a randomly selected value FN (k) for some k. The stateof the rst register immediately after the measurement, due to the periodicity of FN (k), is acoherent superposition of all states jxi such that x = k; k + r; k + 2r;   , i.e. all x for whichFN (x) = FN (k). The value k is randomly selected by the measurement: therefore, the state ofthe rst register is subsequently transformed via a unitary operation which sets any k to 0 (i.e.jki becomes j0i plus a phase factor) and modies the period from r to a multiple of 1=r. Thisoperation is known as the quantum Fourier transform. The rst register is then ready for thenal measurement and yields an integer which is the best whole approximation of a multiple of1=r. From this result r, and subsequently factors of N , can be easily calculated (see the Box).The execution time of the quantum factoring algorithm can be estimated to grow as a quadraticfunction of `, and numbers 100 decimal digits long can be factored in a fraction of a second!When the rst quantum factoring devices are built, the security of public-key cryptosystems willvanish. The mathematical solution to the key distribution problem is shattered by the power ofquantum computation. Does it leave us without any means to protect our privacy ? Fortunatelyquantum mechanics after destroying classical ciphers comes to rescue our privacy and oers itsown solution to the key distribution problem.The main reference for this brief account of quantum cryptanalysis is the paper by Shor [77].A comprehensive exposition of Shor's algorithm for factoring on a quantum computer, togetherwith some relevant background in number theory, computational complexity theory and quantumcomputation including remarks about possible experimental realizations has been prepared forthe Review of Modern Physics by Artur Ekert and Richard Jozsa and can be obtained viaelectronic (postscript le) or postal service. 39
0.46.2 PracticalitiesThe idea of a quantum computer is simple, however its realization is not. Quantum computersrequire a coherent, controlled evolution for a period of time which is necessary to complete thecomputation. Many view this requirement as an insurmountable experimental problem, however,others believe that technological progress will sooner or later make such devices feasible. In anordinary, classical computer, all the bits have a denite state at a given instant in time, say0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0   . However in a quantum computer the state of the bits is described by awave equation such as	 = aj0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1   i+ bj1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1   i (8)The coecients a, b;    are complex numbers and the probability that the computer is in state0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1    is jaj2, that it is in the state 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1    is jbj2, and so on.However, describing the state of the computer by a wave function does not merely imply theordinary uncertainties that we describe using probabilities. For instance, the phases of thecomplex coecients a, b;    have genuine signicance: they can describe interference betweendierent states of the computer, which is very useful for quantum computation. The quantumwave function declares that the computer exists in all of its states simultaneously so long as thatstate is not measured; when we do choose to measure it, a particular state will be observed withthe prescribed probability.DiVincenzo [40] shows how to construct the quantum analogue of the one-bit NOT, or invertergate, with spectroscopic techniques that have been well known in Physics for over 50 years. Hethen shows that the 1956 Feher procedure for polarisation transfer in electron-nucleus doubleresolution has the protocol for making the two-qubit (quantum bit) XOR gate implicit withinit. Finally he shows how the three-qubit AND operation can be performed using three XORgates and four single-qubit rotations.In practice we do not know how to `wire up' the components of the XOR gates and so a quantumcomputer is still just a theoretical possibility. However if a quantum computer could be built itwould be the end of classical cryptography as we know it.The eld of quantum cryptography was pioneered by Stephen Wiesner [89]. Around 1970 at40
Columbia University in New York he showed how quantum eects could in theory be use to pro-duce `quantum bank notes' that are immune to counterfeiting. The rst feasible cryptosystemswere designed between 1982 and 1984 by the American physicist Charles H. Bennett of IBM'sThomas J. Watson Research Center in Yorktown Heights in the US and by the Canadian expertin cryptography, Gilles Brassard from the University of Montreal [5]. In 1989 David Deutschand Artur Ekert [37, 38] at Oxford University developed the idea along slightly dierent lines.Their system is based on another aspect of quantum theory called quantum correlation.In the early 1980s, secure quantum key distribution based on both the Heisenberg uncertaintyprinciple and quantum correlations evolved into a testable system for practical use, though thisis by no means easy to set up. The rst apparatus, constructed by Bennett, Brassard andcolleagues in 1989 [4] at IBM's research center, was capable of transmitting a secret key over adistance of approximately 30 centimeters.Since then, other researchers have looked at systems based on correlations of another quantumproperty of light, called phase. Phase is a measure of how far a photon has gone in its cycle ofvibration. Information about the key is encoded in this property of phase instead of polarisation.This has the advantage that with current technology, phase is easier to handle over a longdistance. Since 1991 John Rarity and Paul Tapster of Britain's [86, 88, 43] Defence ResearchAgency in Malvern have been developing a system to increase the transmission distance. Theyhave designed and tested an optical system good enough to transmit photons that stay correlatedin phase over several hundred meters. Rarity and Tapster believe the distances could increaseto several kilometers, once advances in technology give new optical bers and semiconductorphoto detectors which allow better transmission and detection, and thereby reduce backgrounderrors.In theory, cryptosystems based on quantum correlations should also allow quantum keys to bestored, by storing photons without performing any measurements. At present, however, photonscannot be kept correlated longer than a small fraction of a second, so they are not a good mediumfor information storage. But a fraction of a second is long enough for a photon to cover a longdistance, so photons are suitable for sending information and for key distribution.41
0.47 Research Issues and SummaryIn this chapter we discussed: Secret Sharing, Threshold Cryptography, Signature Schemes, andnally Quantum Key Distribution and Quantum Cryptography. As in the previous chapter, wehave focussed only on the essentials. Supplanting this with the bibliography which expands ourexposition by listing items which prepresent the current research activity in these topics. Wegive a brief summary of our exposition.The central problem in secret sharing is how to distribute parts of a secret, to a group individuals,in such a way that only the pre-designated individuals can recreate the secret. As well as havingdirect application in key management, secret sharing schemes are also components of othercryptographic constructions.Threshold cryptography is concerned with situations where the authority to initiate or per-form cryptographic operations is distributed amongst a group of individuals. Many standardconstructions of single-user cryptography have counterparts in threshold cryptography.A signature scheme is an algorithm for generating and verifying (electronic) signatures for docu-ments. A sub-class of signature schemes deals with the shared-generation and shared-vericationof signatures, where a collaborating group of individuals is required to perform these actions.A new paradigm of security has recently been introduced into cryptography with the emergenceof the ideas of Quantum Key Distribution and Quantum Cryptography. As opposed to classicalcryptography, where various mathematical techniques are used to restrict eavesdroppers fromlearning the contents of encrypted messages, in quantum key distribution the information is pro-tected by the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics. A non-Turing model of computationcan be also be based on the formalism of quantum mechanics. Various computations, notablythe factorization of integers into primes, could be done on such machines with unprecedentedparallelism.0.48 Dening Termssecret sharing: protecting a secret key by distributing it in such a way that only the authorizedindividuals can recreate the key. 42
access structure: a formal specication of the participants in a secret sharing scheme whichare able to recreate a shared key from their portions of the key.geometric secret sharing : a realization of a secret sharing scheme using nite geometry.Usually either ane or projective geometries are used.group cryptosystems : a recent development where cryptographic operations are performedby groups instead of individuals.perfect secret sharing : in such a scheme it is impossible to deduce any partial informationabout a shared key, from less than the critical number of shares of the key.signature schemes: an algorithm which generates and veries a cryptographic signature.threshold scheme: a secret sharing scheme with a uniform access structure in which anycollection of share holders greater than a given threshold can recreate the secret.quantum cryptosystem: methods of securely exchanging private keysacross an insecure channel in which the principles of quantum mechanics are used.quantum computation: a theoretical model of computer based on the principles of quantummechanics. It is known that factoring of integers could be done in polynomial time onsuch a machine.0.49 Further InformationAs in the previous chapter we mention the conferences: CRYPTO, EUROCRYPT, ASIACRYPT,AUSCRYPT, and conferences dealing with security such as ACISP. Journals such as the Com-munications of the ACM. Quantum cryptography is also covered in the physics literature, e.g,Europhys. Letters, Physical Review Letters.AcknowledgementsWe thank Anish Mathuria and Hossein Ghodosi for all their comments and suggestions whichhave greatly helped us improve our exposition.43
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